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The Captive Court: A Study of the Supreme Court of Canada
Ian Bushnell
Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992.,
604 pp.
Reviewed by Subrata Bhattacharjee*
When considering judicial function, the reductionist temperament of lawyers is
such as to make a Gestaltist weep. Non-doctrinal considerations are regularly
subsumed to the understanding of doctrine: what judges say becomes more
important than the context within which they make their pronouncements,
inclusive of social and political considerations. Although lawyers readily
understand the ramifications of a decision for stare decisis, they are often
woefully unaware of the process underlying the production of the decision.
This is what makes Ian Bushnell's book so very interesting. His goal is to
undertake "an examination and critical analysis of the Canadian thoughts that
existed over the years and those that exist today regarding the nature of the
judicial or legal system and the role of a final appeal court within that system." 1
Bushnell's central thesis, borrowed from an article written by ex-Chief Justice
Bora Laskin, is that the history of the Court has been characterized by captivity,
a result of a lack of Canadian legal doctrine, and, indeed, of an independent
judicial tradition.
Bushnell undertakes an examination of the evolution of the Supreme Court
from 1875 to the present. The account is satisfyingly wide ranging, inclusive not
only of selected examples of the court's jurisprudence, but also of the extrajudicial considerations which underlay the formation of the the court, its day to
day function, and arguably, adjudication itself. Going beyond the standard
listings of curriculum vitae, Bushnell makes copious references to public and
professional perceptions of appointees. Thus, we find that the first appointments
to the newly constituted Supreme Court were, in some quarters, treated with
some disdain:
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The opinion of the Conservative Montreal Gazette with regard
to the appointments [from Quebec] was venomous. Fournier's
appointment was attacked by saying that the difficulty in
finding people to accept an appointment may have been
because of 'lawyers of standing [being] unwilling to accept
such a colleague.' He was said not to add strength to the court
and to be little known to the bar. With respect to Taschereau,
the newspaper was polite. He was said to be a gentleman, and
of fair standing in the legal profession. 2
And similarly, media reaction to the ascendancy of the Supreme Court and the
corollary decline of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is
presented as follows:
The censure that appeared in some newspapers concerning the
appeal was based on the idea that the appeal was an
interference with self-government. ... Apparently the
newspapers had split along party lines - the Liberal papers
favoured restricting or ending the appeal, while the
Conservative press wanted to retain the "link of
Empire." ... The Financial Post suggested that the attacks on
the appeal were part of the socialistic movement. 3
Clearly, the study benefits from Bushnell's holistic approach to the subject
matter. In his eagerness, however, to consider the potential external influences
upon judicial function, the author sometimes makes embarrassing gaffes. For
example, in Chapter 27, Bushnell seeks to bolster his assertion that English cases
are still slavishly followed in some contexts by Canadian courts with reference
to Wilson, J. 's reliance upon House of Lords decisions in Beson v. Director of
Child Welfare 4 and City of Kamloops v. Nielsen. 5 Unfortunately, his offered
explanation for the justice's alleged predilection for judicial anglophilia is one
terse line to the effect that "Wilson was born in Britain and arrived in Canada
when an adult."6
The overall thesis of "sterility" is also open to question. In many ways, the
author's conclusion is driven by the book's methodology, that specifically
focusses upon decisions and other issues more or less directly connected with
the institution itself. On this basis, there is no doubt that early 20th century
Anglo-American jurisprudence was characterized by excessive rulism and
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legislative deference, and as Bushnell repeatedly points out, the Canadian
Supreme Court was no exception, particularly in the years 1903 to 1929.
Similarly, there is little doubt that for a time the appointment of justices was
largely on the basis of privilege, resulting in an ideologically homogenous
bench. If these were the only factors we were to consider in assessing the
Supreme Court's efficacy, then we might be justified in concluding, as Bushnell
does, that the majority of the years of the court's existence have been
characterized by "sterility ."7
Nonetheless, there are other indicia to suggest that Bushnell's conclusion
ignores the societal context within which the Court operates. In the last three
chapters especially, it seems that judicial progressivity is equated with the
pursuit of the readily ascertainable social goals embodied in the Charter, with
the conclusion that pre-Charter days were characterized by rulism. There is no
doubt that the relatively late addition of the Charter revolutionized perceptions
of the judiciary, providing an idealized standard with which to measure
governmental and individual conduct. In 1982, judges were called upon to
engage in highly public deliberations which were often explicitly political and
value-laden in nature. Through Charter-struck eyes, the pre-1982 years do
indeed seem sterile, characterized not by discussions of fundamental freedoms
or equality rights, but rather by less inspiring subjects such as the division of
powers.
This, however, does not necessarily mean that the pre-Charter years saw the,
Supreme Court as being a captive institution. As Professor Peter Russell has
suggested, the court's exercise of policy-making power has been a constant
throughout its existence, through adjudication on matters of common law,
interpretation of statutes, or the refereeing of the constitutional division of
powers. 8 The appearance of a constitutional guarantee of rights merely operates
to further expose what the courts have been doing all along to the public eye.
The greatest strength of this book is its approach to its subject. Bushnell is
free of the dubious preconception that politics and other social pressures are
absent from the operations of the highest court in the land. In incorporating
information pertaining to the class background of judges and the circumstances
surrounding their appointments and pronouncements, the author provides the
reader with the much needed background necessary to understand the nature of
the doctrinal webs spun by judges. Judging is a political activity. The cardinal
virtue of The Captive Court is that it recognizes this, allowing readers to gain a
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fuller appreciation of the role of the Supreme Court and indeed, of the judiciary,
in government.

